| Nosaukums | The performance of a GNSS-based positioning terminal, hereafter referred to as GBPT, can be significantly affected by unexpected radio frequency signals.
These signals can be unintentional, such as electromagnetic interference, or intentional, such as jamming, spoofing and meaconing. Such active disturbances can degrade the accuracy of the position, velocity and time solution, and can also affect, directly or indirectly, the availability, continuity and integrity of the service delivered by the GBPT.
ISO 25082-2 addresses the assessment of nominal GBPT performance in typical use conditions, using the record and replay technique. These typical use conditions include the dynamics of the smart mobility application and passive disturbances caused by local propagation phenomena, such as tunnels, bridges, foliage or reflections on surrounding infrastructures.
The purpose of ISO 25082-3 is to extend this metrological framework to the evaluation of GBPT vulnerability to active disturbances. The future standard will specify the minimum requirements for the proper implementation of test methods intended to assess the behaviour and vulnerability level of GBPTs when exposed to intentional or unintentional radio frequency interference affecting GNSS signals.
The standard will cover active disturbances including, but not limited to:
• unintentional radio frequency interference;
• intentional jamming;
• spoofing, i.e. GNSS signal deception using synthesized substitute signals.;
• meaconing, i.e. GNSS signal deception using rebroadcast or replayed authentic signals.
The assessment methodology will be based both on the measurement of GNSS observables and on the comparison of GBPT performance in a given representative scenario, without active disturbance, and in the same scenario, in the presence of one or more controlled active disturbances.
The objective is to quantify the degradation of the PVT (Position, Velocity and Time) solution with respect to a reference trajectory or reference timing solution, and to characterize the resulting effects on the service continuity and the accuracy.
The test scenarios considered in ISO 25082-3 shall be realistic of the intended uses of the GBPT. As far as possible, they shall be derived from GNSS signals previously collected in real-world environments and replayed under controlled laboratory conditions, in relation with ISO 25082 series.
Part 3 of ISO 25082 shall define the requirements necessary to ensure that the introduction of active disturbances during scenario replay testing is controlled, traceable and that test results are reproducible when the same methods are applied.
ISO 25082-3 will specify minimum requirements for:
• Definition and documentation of active disturbance scenarios;
• Generation, injection, synchronization and calibration of GNSS attack signals;
• Development of relevant test scenarios used for nominal/under attack performance assessment;
• GNSS Measurement of GBPT outputs before, during and after the disturbance;
• PVT Measurement of GBPT outputs before, during and after the disturbance;
• Processing and statistical analysis of GNSS measurements, PVT deviations and the service degradation indicators such as the protection levels;
• Comparison of results between nominal and disturbed conditions;
• Reporting of test results in standardized formats
The standard shall specify a common and reliable metrological framework enabling the consistent assessment, classification and comparison of GBPT vulnerability when exposed to the same active GNSS disturbances. This framework shall enable the relevant stakeholders to define application-specific performance thresholds in the field of smart mobility and shall facilitate comparisons between different receiver architectures and different mitigation algorithms.
Together with the parts 1, 2 and 3 of the ISO25082 standard will provide a coherent methodology for assessing both nominal performance and vulnerability under disturbed conditions, ensuring that tests are conducted under representative, repeatable, reproducible and affordable conditions. |
|---|
| Darbības sfēra | The performance of a GNSS-based positioning terminal, hereafter referred to as GBPT, can be significantly affected by unexpected radio frequency signals.
These signals can be unintentional, such as electromagnetic interference, or intentional, such as jamming, spoofing and meaconing. Such active disturbances can degrade the accuracy of the position, velocity and time solution, and can also affect, directly or indirectly, the availability, continuity and integrity of the service delivered by the GBPT.
ISO 25082-2 addresses the assessment of nominal GBPT performance in typical use conditions, using the record and replay technique. These typical use conditions include the dynamics of the smart mobility application and passive disturbances caused by local propagation phenomena, such as tunnels, bridges, foliage or reflections on surrounding infrastructures.
The purpose of ISO 25082-3 is to extend this metrological framework to the evaluation of GBPT vulnerability to active disturbances. The future standard will specify the minimum requirements for the proper implementation of test methods intended to assess the behaviour and vulnerability level of GBPTs when exposed to intentional or unintentional radio frequency interference affecting GNSS signals.
The standard will cover active disturbances including, but not limited to:
• unintentional radio frequency interference;
• intentional jamming;
• spoofing, i.e. GNSS signal deception using synthesized substitute signals.;
• meaconing, i.e. GNSS signal deception using rebroadcast or replayed authentic signals.
The assessment methodology will be based both on the measurement of GNSS observables and on the comparison of GBPT performance in a given representative scenario, without active disturbance, and in the same scenario, in the presence of one or more controlled active disturbances.
The objective is to quantify the degradation of the PVT (Position, Velocity and Time) solution with respect to a reference trajectory or reference timing solution, and to characterize the resulting effects on the service continuity and the accuracy.
The test scenarios considered in ISO 25082-3 shall be realistic of the intended uses of the GBPT. As far as possible, they shall be derived from GNSS signals previously collected in real-world environments and replayed under controlled laboratory conditions, in relation with ISO 25082 series.
Part 3 of ISO 25082 shall define the requirements necessary to ensure that the introduction of active disturbances during scenario replay testing is controlled, traceable and that test results are reproducible when the same methods are applied.
ISO 25082-3 will specify minimum requirements for:
• Definition and documentation of active disturbance scenarios;
• Generation, injection, synchronization and calibration of GNSS attack signals;
• Development of relevant test scenarios used for nominal/under attack performance assessment;
• GNSS Measurement of GBPT outputs before, during and after the disturbance;
• PVT Measurement of GBPT outputs before, during and after the disturbance;
• Processing and statistical analysis of GNSS measurements, PVT deviations and the service degradation indicators such as the protection levels;
• Comparison of results between nominal and disturbed conditions;
• Reporting of test results in standardized formats
The standard shall specify a common and reliable metrological framework enabling the consistent assessment, classification and comparison of GBPT vulnerability when exposed to the same active GNSS disturbances. This framework shall enable the relevant stakeholders to define application-specific performance thresholds in the field of smart mobility and shall facilitate comparisons between different receiver architectures and different mitigation algorithms.
Together with the parts 1, 2 and 3 of the ISO25082 standard will provide a coherent methodology for assessing both nominal performance and vulnerability under disturbed conditions, ensuring that tests are conducted under representative, repeatable, reproducible and affordable conditions. |
|---|
